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1. Investigating folk conceptions of free will and moral responsibility 
 
If we define FREE WILL as the type of control one has to exert upon one’s action to be morally 
responsible for them (see for example Mele, 2008)1, then FREE WILL is not a technical concept 
coined by philosophers, such as ALIEFS, EMERGENCE, or TROPES. Rather, such a concept seems 
to be already present in our everyday practices – at least at an implicit level, where it guides 
our assessment of others’ moral responsibility, the reactive attitudes we adopt towards them 
and certain behaviors such as rewards and punishment. Long before Aquinas introduced the 
expression liberum arbitrium, people were distinguishing between people who acted willfully 
and those who acted under duress, and responded to their actions accordingly. 
 Thus, it is not a stretch to say that philosophical reflection on free will takes its roots 
in an intuitive notion that pervades our interactions with others. Recently, philosophers and 
psychologists have tried to get a better understanding of this everyday understanding of free 
will. Their research has focused on two different questions. The first one is what kind of 
control do people think we need to have over our actions to be morally responsible for them? 
 
1 Of course, not every philosopher accepts this definition of free will (see for example van Inwagen, 2008). 
However, for reasons that will get clearer as we progress, this is the one I will be using here. One objection to 
this kind of definition is that “moral responsibility” comes in different varieties (Rossi & Warfield, 2017). In the 
context of this paper, I will use “moral responsibility” in the sense of accountability (Watson, 1996). 
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The second is what kind of control do people think we actually have on our actions? In this 
chapter, I will focus on the first question, as it is the one that has generated the most research 
and debate in the past years (though I will briefly touch on the second towards the end of the 
chapter). 
 
1.1. The relevance of folk intuitions to the philosophical debate on free will 
Besides the obvious psychological importance of these questions for our understanding of the 
human mind and social cognition, one might wonder what is the relevance of such inquiries 
for philosophical theorizing about free will. An answer is that intuitions about the conditions 
required for moral responsibility play a major role in philosophical debates about the nature 
of free will: most arguments take as their premise either principles that are supposed to be 
self-evident (e.g. the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, van Inwagen’s Rule Beta) or 
intuitions about individual thought-experiments (e.g. Frankfurt cases, Manipulation 
arguments). 
However, despite some attempts (e.g. Double, 1996), the free will debate is still in 
need of an explicitly articulated meta-philosophy, and it is not clear what the status and role 
of such intuitions are. There are several ways to understand the role intuitions play in the 
philosophical debate about the nature of free will. According to what I call the weak view, 
intuitions only set the default point and determine on who lies the burden of proof (e.g. 
Nahmias et al., 2006). According to the moderate view, intuitions give us access to certain 
modal truths about free will and moral responsibility (e.g. that it is possible for someone to be 
morally responsible even if one could not have done otherwise) and constitute prima facie 
defeasible evidence in their favor. Finally, according to what I call the strong view, intuitions 
have the power to determine the subject matter of the free will debate, either because 
widespread intuitions and truisms about free will and moral responsibility actually determine 
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the reference of the expression ‘free will’, or because these intuitions provide the main basis 
for a conceptual analysis of our shared concept of FREE WILL, in a way that makes it 
impossible for an adequate theory of free will to ignore our intuitions about it (e.g. Jackson, 
1998). Whatever your position on these matters, it seems clear that getting a better grasp of 
the intuitive ground from which the philosophical problem of free will emerged might prove 
useful in evaluating certain philosophical arguments. 
 
1.2. Two main positions: natural compatibilism vs. natural incompatibilism 
In their study of folk intuitions about the nature of free will, experimental philosophers and 
psychologists have mainly focused on the compatibility question: do people consider 
determinism to prevent the possibility of free will? Natural Incompatibilism is the claim that 
laypeople conceive free will in such a way that it is incompatible with determinism, because 
they take determinism to be an obstacle to free will. Natural Compatibilism is the claim that 
free will as we intuitively think of it is perfectly compatible with determinism. Though some 
have argued that the very same people can sometimes have compatibilist and incompatibilist 
intuitions depending on the context (Cova, 2011; Doris, Knobe & Woolfolk, 2007; Knobe & 
Nichols, 2010), most of the debate in the literature has been framed as an opposition between 
Natural Compatibilism and Natural Incompatibilism. In this chapter, I will review this 
experimental literature and argue that, if we were to choose between the two, Natural 
Compatibilism would be a better fit of the available data. 
 But before we start, I need make two additional remarks. The first one is about the 
material I will cover in this chapter. As pointed out by Cova & Kitano (2014) and Feltz 
(2017), these studies come in two kinds. A first group set of studies tries to directly address 
the compatibility question, by investigating whether people think that an agent in a 
deterministic universe can be free and morally responsible. A second group indirectly 
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addresses the question by studying whether people share the intuitions that serve as premise to 
philosophical arguments for and against the compatibility of free will with determinism, such 
as Frankfurt-style cases (Cova, 2014, 2017; Miller & Feltz, 2011) or Manipulation arguments 
(Björnsson, 2016; Cova, forthcoming; Feltz, 2013; Sripada, 2012). In this chapter, I focus on 
studies that try to directly address the compatibility question. 
 The second remark is about the way these studies have operationalized and measured 
free will. Some studies directly ask participants about free will (e.g. by asking them whether 
the agent freely did a certain thing, or did a certain thing of his own free will), other ask 
participants about moral responsibility (e.g. by asking whether the agent is morally 
responsible for doing something, or deserves blame/praise or a punishment/reward for what 
they did), and others ask both types of questions. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, I 
will focus on free will defined as the type of control required by moral responsibility – 
meaning that, when both kinds of measure will yield different conclusions, I will take 
participants’ answers about moral responsibility as the most reliable indicator. Indeed, though 
investigating how participants use terms such as ‘free will’ or ‘freely’ might be interesting in 
its own right, it is not clear how these are relevant to the philosophical debate, as very few 
philosophical arguments seem to depend on linguistic intuitions about the way such words are 
used in everyday language. Moreover, while practices involving attributions of moral 
responsibility (such as reactive attitudes or punishment) seem pervasive and human 
universals, some cultures seem to lack words or expressions that would be equivalent to ‘free 
will’ (Berniūnas et al., 2021). Finally, most people take philosophical debates about free will 
to be important precisely because of their practical relevance and the implications they have 
for our image of ourselves as morally responsible agents. For all these reasons, I will thus 
focus on participants’ intuitions about moral responsibility when possible. 
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2. A short history of the Natural Compatibilism vs. Natural Incompatibilism debate 
 
2.1. Folks as natural compatibilists 
The first studies on the compatibility question were published in 2005 and 2006 by Nahmias 
and his colleagues (Nahmias et al., 2005, 2006). The principle of these studies was quite 
simple: participants were presented with a description of a deterministic universe, then were 
told about an agent living in this universe performing a particular action. Participants were 
then asked whether the agent was morally responsible for this action, and acted of his own 
free will. 
 Here is an example: 
 
SUPERCOMPUTER – Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, 
and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the 
current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at 
any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict 
everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer 
existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25, 2150 AD, 
20 years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information 
and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 
26, 2195. As always, the supercomputer’s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity 
Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195. 
 
Some participants were then asked: 
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Imagine such a supercomputer actually did exist and actually could predict the future, 
including Jeremy’s robbing the bank (and assume Jeremy does not know about the 
prediction): 
Do you think that, when Jeremy robs the bank, he acts of his own free will? 
 
While others were asked:  
 
Do you think that when Jeremy robs the bank, he’s morally blameworthy for it? 
 
To the first question, 76% of participants answered that Jeremy acted of his own free will. To 
the second, 83% of participants answered that Jeremy was morally blameworthy. In another 
version, Jeremy did not rob a bank but saved a child from a burning building. To this 
scenario, 68% of participants answered that Jeremy saved the child of his own free will and 
88% judged that Jeremy was praiseworthy for having saved the child. Finally, in a third 
version of the story, Jeremy decided to go jogging. In this case, 79% of participants answered 
that Jeremy went jogging of his own free will. 
Nahmias and his colleagues obtained similar results for scenarios describing a 
universe in which one’s actions and decisions are fully determined by the combination of 
one’s genes and upbringing, and for scenarios describing a universe submitted to Eternal 
Recurrence, where the same things are doomed to happen again and again. Together, these 
results suggest that most (though not all) of their participants have compatibilist intuitions: 





Figure 1. Folks as natural compatibilists. 
 
2.2. Folks as natural incompatibilists: the Performance Error Model 
However, things might not be so straightforward. Noticing that the scenarios used by 
Nahmias and his colleagues all make use of ‘concrete’ cases, in which participants are asked 
about a single action performed by a given, identifiable individual, Nichols and Knobe (2007) 
investigated how participants would respond to more ‘abstract’ questions. They first presented 
participants with the following description of two universes: 
 
Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely caused 
by whatever happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the universe, so 
what happened in the beginning of the universe caused what happened next, and so on 
right up until the present. For example, one day John decided to have French Fries at 
lunch. Like everything else, this decision was completely caused by what happened 
before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same up until John made his 
decision, then it had to happen that John would decide to have French Fries. 
Now imagine a universe (Universe B) in which almost everything that happens is 
completely caused by whatever happened before it. The one exception is human decision 
making. For example, one day Mary decided to have French Fries at lunch. Since a 
person’s decision in this universe is not completely caused by what happened before it, 
even if everything in the universe was exactly the same up until Mary made her decision, 
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it did not have to happen that Mary would decide to have French Fries. She could have 
decided to have something different. 
The key difference, then, is that in Universe A every decision is completely caused by 
what happened before the decision – given the past, each decision has to happen the way 
that it does. By contrast, in Universe B, decisions are not completely caused by the past, 
and each human decision does not have to happen the way that it does. 
 
Obviously, Universe A is intended to be a deterministic universe, while Universe B, by 
contract, is intended to be an indeterministic universe. After reading this description, 
participants were randomly assigned to the concrete or abstract condition. Participants in the 
concrete condition received the following vignette: 
 
In Universe A, a man named Bill has become attracted to his secretary, and he decides 
that the only way to be with her is to kill his wife and 3 children. He knows that it is 
impossible to escape from his house in the event of a fire. Before he leaves on a business 
trip, he sets up a device in his basement that burns down the house and kills his family. 
Is Billy fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children? 
 
In this condition, most participants (72%) gave the compatibilist answer according to which 
the agent was fully morally responsible, even if he lived in deterministic universe A. These 
results are consistent with those obtained by Nahmias and his colleagues. But, let’s now 
consider the abstract condition. Participants in this condition had no scenario to read but just 
received the following question: 
 
In Universe A, is it possible for a person to be morally responsible for their actions? 
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In this condition, most participants (86%) gave the incompatibilist answer. To put it 
otherwise: participants tended to deny that agents could be morally responsible for their 
action in the deterministic universe A. Thus, participants’ answers to experimental 
philosophers’ probes seem incoherent. How are we to explain these results? 
 Nichols and Knobe have their own explanation; the Performance Error Model. 
According to this model, the folk conception of free will is, at its core, perfectly 
incompatibilist: free will, as we naturally conceive it, is incompatible with determinism. This 
commitment is what is reflected in the abstract condition, when participants are not asked to 
judge and condemn a particular individual: they give mostly incompatibilist answers. 
However, when faced with a concrete case (that is: a case featuring a given agent performing 
a precise action), participants’ intuitions and judgments can be swayed by their emotions. 
Indeed, particular actions can be revolting and outrageous (as Billy’s murder of his wife and 
three children), thus eliciting the desire to punish the agent. This desire, in turn, leads people 
to justify their desire to punish the agent by attributing him a certain amount of moral 




Figure 2. Nichols and Knobe’s Performance Error Model. 
 
 Nichols and Knobe’s Performance Error Model is in line with other findings in social 
psychology, namely that people are more likely to believe in free will when they have just 
been presented with descriptions of moral violations (Clark et al., 2014). It is also supported 
by additional evidence presented by Nichols and Knobe themselves. Indeed, one prediction of 
the Performance Error Model is that participants should give mostly incompatibilist answer 
when presented with a concrete case that is not emotionally salient. To test this prediction, 
Nichols and Knobe designed two new conditions. The low affect condition was the following: 
 
As he has done many times in the past, Mark arranges to cheat on his taxes. Is it possible 
that Mark is fully morally responsible for cheating on his taxes? 
 
While the high affect condition was the following: 
 
As he has done many times in the past, Bill stalks and rapes a stranger. Is it possible that 
Bill is fully morally responsible for raping the stranger? 
 
Participants were assigned either to the low affect or high affect condition, and told either that 
the agent lived in the (deterministic) Universe A or that he lived in the (indeterministic) 
Universe B. Table 1 describes, for each case, the proportion of participants who judged that 
the agent could be fully morally responsible for his action. 
 
 Agent in deterministic 
universe A 
Agent in indeterministic 
universe B 
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High Affect 64% 95% 
Low Affect 23% 89% 
 
Table 1. Results from Nichols & Knobe (2007) 
 
As predicted by Nichols and Knobe’s Performance Error Model, participants in the low affect 
condition tended to judge that the agent could not be responsible for cheating on his taxes 
when he lived in a deterministic universe. On the contrary, participants in the high affect 
condition judged that the agent was morally responsible for raping his victim, even when he 
lived in a deterministic universe. Thus, it seems that participants’ intuitions perfectly fit the 
Performance Error Model. 
 However, there is a problem with Nichols and Knobe’s results: other experimental 
philosophers have had a lot of trouble replicating them. Indeed, though the difference between 
the abstract and concrete condition seems robust (and has been replicated in several 
countries, see Sarkissian et al., 2010), other experimental philosophers had trouble replicating 
the difference between the low affect and high affect conditions. A meta-analysis by Feltz and 
Cova (2014), which aggregated all known attempts at replicating this effect, found that the 
real difference between the low and high affect conditions was actually very small – and thus 
that the effect of emotional reactions on judgments about moral responsibility were not strong 
enough to actually explain the huge difference between the abstract and concrete condition. 
Another problem for the Performance Error Model comes from a study conducted by 
Cova, Bertoux and their colleagues (2012) on patients suffering from a behavioral variant of 
frontotemporal dementia, a neurodegenerative disease accompanied by a deficit in emotional 
responses. Given bvFTD patients’ impaired emotional reactions to descriptions of gruesome 
and violent acts, the Performance Error Model should predict that bvFTD patients, being free 
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of emotional biases, should give more incompatibilist answers than control participants to 
concrete cases. Thus, Cova and his colleagues presented participants with the supercomputer 
and concrete cases. However, bvFTD patients gave the same answers as control participants – 
that is: mostly compatibilist answers. 
Thus, it seems that participants’ compatibilist answers cannot be explained away as 
the mere effect of emotional biases. We thus need another explanation for the apparent 
incoherence in participants’ judgments about moral responsibility. 
 
2.3. Folks as natural compatibilists: the Bypassing Hypothesis 
This other explanation is Murray and Nahmias’ Bypassing Hypothesis (Murray & Nahmias, 
2014). As the Performance Error Model, the Bypassing Hypothesis was originally designed to 
account for an apparent incoherence in participants’ judgments. Indeed, as a follow-up on his 
prior investigations, Nahmias (2006) decided to investigate whether the kind of determinism 
participants were presented with would make a difference (see also Nahmias, Coates & 
Kvaran, 2007). This is why he used a pair of scenarios describing two different kinds of 
determinism. The first scenario (psychological determinism) described a planet similar to ours 
(Erta) inhabited by people called the Ertans. On this planet, Ertan psychologist have 
discovered that the Ertan’s thoughts, desires, and plans occurring in her or his mind 
completely cause all the decision the Ertan makes. The psychologists also have discovered 
that these thoughts, desires and plans are completely caused by the Ertan’s current situation 
and the antecedent events she or he has been through. In the second scenario (neurological 
determinism), the same planet was described but, this time, the neuroscientists have 
discovered that the decision the Ertan makes is completely caused by the specific neural 
processes occurring in his or her brain; these neural processes are completely caused by the 
Ertan’s current and the antecedent events she or he has been through. 
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For both scenarios, participants were asked if Ertans could act of their own free will 
and whether they deserved to be given credit or blame for their actions. In the psychological 
determinism condition, 72% of participants answered positively to the first question and 77% 
answered positively to the second question, thus giving perfectly compatibilist answers. In the 
neurological determinism condition, only 18% of participants answered positively to the first 
question and 19% to the second question, that is: clearly incompatibilist answers. To put it 
otherwise: participants gave mostly compatibilist answers in the first case and mostly 
incompatibilist answers in the second case. Once again, there seems to be something 
incoherent in participants’ judgments about free will and moral responsibility. 
However, Nahmias offers a plausible explanation for this pattern of judgment. 
According to him, this asymmetry arises because people take neurological determinism, but 
not psychological determinism, to imply that people’s mental states play no role in the 
generation of their decisions and actions – that people’s mental state are, so to speak, 
bypassed. But, both compatibilists and incompatibilists alike would agree that we would not 
be free nor morally responsible for our actions if our desires, beliefs and values played no role 
in our decisions and actions. Thus, participants’ seemingly ‘incompatibilist’ answers to 
neurological determinism case do not show that they have an incompatibilist understanding of 
free will – only that (i) they take neurological determinism to imply ‘bypassing’ and (ii) that 
they take ‘bypassing’ to exclude free will and moral responsibility. On the other hand, their 
compatibilist answers to the psychological determinism case reflect their true, compatibilist 
understanding of free will. 
According to Murray and Nahmias (2014, see also Nahmias and Murray, 2011), the 
same kind of explanation can be applied for the difference between Nichols and Knobe’s 
abstract and concrete conditions. For them, Nichols and Knobe’s description of determinism 
is misleading and lead participants to assume not only that Universe A is deterministic (i.e. 
 14 
that every human action in it is fully caused by prior events), but also that it involves 
‘bypassing’ (i.e. that agents’ mental states do not play a causal role in the generation of their 
actions and decisions). This is why participants who are presented with this case and asked 
the abstract question give seemingly ‘incompatibilist’ answers: they are just expressing their 
belief that moral responsibility is incompatible with ‘bypassing’. 
But why do participants tend to give compatibilist answer in the concrete case, then? 
Here, the idea is that, because the concrete case clearly states that the agent acts on the basis 
of his mental states difference (he kills his wife and children because he wants to be with his 
secretary), participants might be less likely to infer that determinism entails bypassing in these 
cases. Hence the mostly compatibilist answers (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Nahmias and Murray’s Bypassing Hypothesis. 
 
To test these predictions, Nahmias and Murray (2011) presented participants either 
with Nichols and Knobe’s abstract and concrete condition (in Universe A), or with an 
abstract and a concrete version of the eternal recurrence case used by Nahmias and his 
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colleagues (2006). For each scenario, participants were not only asked if agents in these 
scenarios deserved praise or blame and acted from their own free will, but they were also 
asked questions designed to probe their understanding of determinism, and to which extent 
they were likely to confuse determinism with bypassing: 
 
Decisions: In Universe [A/C], a person’s decisions have no effect on what they end up 
being caused to do.  
Wants: In Universe [A/C], what a person wants has no effect on what they end up being 
caused to do. 
Believes: In Universe [A/C], what a person believes has no effect on what they end up 
being caused to do.  
No Control: In Universe [A/C], a person has no control over what they do.  
 
Participants’ answers to these questions were aggregated to constitute a bypassing score. The 
higher the score, the more participants were likely to confuse determinism with bypassing. 
Then, Nichols and Murray conducted a mediation analysis to determine to which extent 
participants’ tendency to confuse determinism with bypassing explained the impact of 
different scenarios on participants’ judgments about free will and moral responsibility. The 
results of this analysis (presented in Figure 4) revealed that bypassing scores fully mediated 
the effect of scenarios on judgments of free will and moral responsibility, suggesting that 
participants’ incompatibilist judgments are indeed explained by their taking determinism to 
imply bypassing. To put it otherwise: seemingly incompatibilist judgments seem to be the 
product of a confusion, and when people understand exactly what determinism is, they tend to 




Figure 4. Mediation analysis by Nahmias and Murray (2011) 
 
3. Answering methodological objections to the Bypassing Hypothesis 
 
3.1. Two objections to the Bypassing Hypothesis 
The Bypassing Hypothesis seem to support the idea that people are mostly compatibilists at 
heart (what we called Natural compatibilism). However, for all its merits, the Bypassing 
Hypothesis has drawn several criticisms. 
 A first set of criticisms comes from Rose and Nichols (2013). They argue that 
Nahmias and Murray’s model is not the only (nor the best) explanation for their results. 
Indeed, it turns out that, re-analyzing Nahmias and Murray’s results, one can find that free 
will and moral responsibility scores (henceforth: FW/MR scores) also mediate the effect of 
scenarios on bypassing scores. So, Nahmias and Murray’s data are compatible with two 
different models: 
• The Bypassing Hypothesis: Scenarios → Bypassing scores → FW/MR scores 
• The Incompatibilist Model: Scenarios → FW/MR scores → Bypassing scores 
To determine which of these two models is the best, Rose and Nichols recruited participants 
that were presented with Nichols and Knobe’s abstract condition, either situated in Universe 
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A or Universe B. Participants were asked questions about free will, moral responsibility, and 
bypassing. Rose and Nichols then used structural equation modelling and the TETRAD IV 
program to compare the Bypassing Hypothesis and the Incompatibilist Model. They found 




Figure 5. Rose and Nichols’ Incompatibilist Model. Arrows represent a direct, causal 
connection. The numbers above each edge are linear coefficients 
 
A second, related set of criticisms was put forward by Björnsson (2014). Björnsson 
ran a new study using questions about free will, moral responsibility and bypassing, but also 
introducing a new type of question, which he calls throughpass questions: 
 
Abstract Throughpass: In Universe A, when earlier events cause an agent’s action, they 
typically do so by affecting what the agent believes and wants, which in turn causes the 
agent to act in a certain way. 
Concrete Throughpass: When earlier events caused Bill’s action, they did so by 
affecting what he believed and wanted, which in turn caused him to act in a certain way. 
 
Throughpass questions are supposed to be the polar opposite of bypassing questions: they 
present a universe in which agents’ mental states play a crucial role in the generation of their 
action. Thus, if bypassing questions are interpreted by participants as intended by Nahmias 
 18 
and Murray, we should observe an inverse correlation between participants’ agreement to the 
throughpass and bypassing statements. 
 Björnsson’s results raise two problems for the Bypassing Hypothesis. First, he found 
that bypassing scores did not fully mediate the effect of scenarios on FW/MR scores, which 
suggests that participants’ tendency to confuse determinism with bypassing does not 
completely explain their incompatibilist judgments. Second, he found a weak but positive 
correlation between bypassing and throughpass statements, which suggests that participants 
might not interpret bypassing questions as intended by Nahmias and Murray. 
 Taken together, these findings cast doubt on the validity of the Bypassing Hypothesis. 
Should we then discard the Bypassing Hypothesis? I don’t think so. Why? Here is the short 
answer: because, even it faces some issues, it still constitutes a very good explanation for a 
range of phenomena, such as the difference between the abstract and concrete condition and 
the difference between psychological and neurological determinism. Rose and Nichols’ 
Incompatibilist Model might well be a better fit of the data, it does not have this kind of 
explanatory power. In fact, it is not even clear whether there is a good psychological 
explanation that would correspond to the Incompatibilist Model. Why would judgments about 
free will and moral responsibility drive judgments about bypassing? Is it because participants 
first judge that free will and moral responsibility are impossible in a deterministic universe, 
then try to justify this judgment by appealing to bypassing-related considerations? But if 
participants were truly incompatibilists (and not compatibilists), they should not feel the need 
to point at such considerations to justify their judgment. Thus, it is not clear how we are 
supposed to make psychological sense of the Incompatibilist Model and, despite its problems, 
the Bypass Hypothesis is still the best available explanation for participants’ judgments in a 
wider range of cases. 
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3.2. Answering the Throughpass objection 
Now, for those who would not be satisfied with this short answer, there is a longer, much 
more technical one. Let’s first begin with Björnsson’s most puzzling finding: that there is a 
positive correlation between bypassing and throughpass statements, that are supposed to 
measure opposed constructs. How are we to account for these results? 
 To explain them, I must introduce a distinction between the deep self (and deep 
motivational states) and the superficial self (and superficial motivational states). In his 1889 
book on Time and Free Will, French philosopher Henri Bergson developed a conception of 
the human mind as composed of several layers (Bergson, 1889/2002). The mental states that 
belong to the innermost layer constitute the ‘deep self’: these are the values and commitments 
that define who we really are. The outermost, shallow layers are constituted by mental states 
that are not truly ‘ours’: habits, automatism, social conditioning and pressure, etc. According 
to Bergson, to be free is to break the ‘crust’ of shallow mental states to act on the basis of our 
‘deep self’. 
 Similar ideas can be found in contemporary analytical philosophy (Watson, 1975; 
Wolf, 1993; Sripada, 2016). More importantly, recent empirical studies have confirmed that 
most people naturally think this way, and distinguish between one’s deep self and one’s 
superficial self (Cova, 2011; Newman, Bloom & Knobe, 2014, Sripada, 2012). Thus, people 
naturally make a distinction between two kinds of mental states: those who belong to the deep 
self, and reflect what we really care about, and those who belong to the superficial self, and 
can go against what we really believe and want. 
 With this distinction at hand, we have an easy explanation for Björnsson’s results. 
Take the following example: John really loves Sally. But Black, a master hypnotist 
hypnotizes John to induce in him the irrepressible desire to be mean and cruel to Sally. Now, 
John has two kinds of mental states: a desire to help and protect Sally (that reflect what he 
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really cares about, and is thus part of his deep self) and a desire to harm her (that has been 
induced by Black, and is thus part of his superficial self). Now, imagine that we present 
participants with this case. We then ask them how much they agree with the corresponding 
throughpass statement: 
 
When earlier events caused John’s action, they did so by affecting what he believed and 
wanted, which in turn caused him to act in a certain way. 
 
Here, we can expect most participants to agree with this statement: after all, when Black 
causes John to be mean to Sally, he does so by affecting John’s mental states (i.e. desires). 
But, let’s now imagine that participants are presented with the following bypassing statement: 
 
What John wants has no effect on what he ends up being caused to do. 
 
Would participants agree with this statement? In one sense, they should disagree: if John is 
now mean to Sally, it is precisely because he wants to. But, at the same time, there is a sense 
in which this statement is true: what John really wants (i.e. being kind to Sally) has actually 
no effect of what he ends up being caused to do. The statement is thus ambiguous: should 
“what John wants” be interpreted in a broad way, as encompassing his superficial desires and 
wants, or in a more restricted sense, as “what he really wants”? 
 Let’s now imagine that the majority of participants actually adopt the narrow 
interpretation, and think they are asked about what John really wants. In this case, we should 
expect agreement with the bypassing statement to be high. And, thus, we obtain a positive 
correlation between throughpass and bypassing statements. But this correlation does not 
constitute a contradiction: one can think that John’s actions are caused by his mental states, 
without accepting that they are caused by his deep mental states. The same is true for 
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Björnsson’s results: if participants take determinism to imply that one is caused to act only by 
their superficial mental states, and thus that deep mental states play no role in the generation 
of one’s actions, we should also observe the positive correlation Björnsson observed. 
 Is this explanation of Björnsson’s results the right one? To find out, I conducted an 
online study in which participants were presented with one vignette introducing two 
characters: John, a gifted and ambitious neuroscientist who needs money, and Bill, the 
neighbor of John’s aunt. At the end of the vignette, John always made it so that Bill killed the 
aunt and that John inherited her money. The vignette existed in 6 different version, varying 
across two dimensions. The first dimension was Manipulation: how John made it so that Bill 
ended up killing the aunt. In one case (Body control), John directly took control of Bill’s 
body, not intervening on Bill’s mental states. In another case (Mind control), John induced in 
Bill a strong and irresistible urge to kill John’s aunt. Finally, in the third option (Money), 
John, knowing that Bill was in desperate need of money, simply offered Bill money in 
exchange of killing his aunt. The second dimension was Reasons: whether Bill had personal 
reasons for killing John’s aunt (he hated her) or had personal reasons against killing her (they 
were friends). After reading the vignette, participants were asked to indicate their agreement 
(on a scale from -3 to 3) with a series of statements, including (i) statements about Bill’s 
moral responsibility, statements about Bill’s free will, (iii) bypassing statements, and (iv) a 
throughpass statement. The results of this study are presented in Table 2. 
 
 Body control Mind control Money 
Reasons For Against For Against For Against 
Resp. -2.15 (1.26) -2.38 (1.28) -1.08 (1.81) -1.94 (1.32) 2.12 (1.09) 2.21 (0.99) 
Free Will -2.70 (0.94) -2.77 (1.05) -2.16 (1.52) -2.74 (0.70) 0.58 (2.10) 0.55 (2.06) 
Bypass 1.85 (1.38) 2.39 (1.07) 1.13 (1.46) 1.89 (1.29) -1.44 (1.05) -1.27 (1.15) 
 22 
Throughpass 0.11 (2.13) 0.59 (2.39) 1.08 (1.65) 1.43 (1.88) 0.59 (1.59) 0.78 (1.53) 
N 87 73 75 90 83 91 
Table 2. Mean and SDs for participants’ answers to the manipulation study in function of 
type of Manipulation and Reasons for responsibility, bypassing and throughpass scores. 
 
 As expected, bypassing scores were very high for the Body control condition (in which 
the agents’ mental states played no role) and low in the Money condition (in which the agent 
acts on his own). Bypassing scores in the Mind control condition (in which the agent acts on 
the basis of a mental state, but one that is externally induced) were significantly lower than in 
the Body control condition, but still higher than midpoint, and way higher than in the Money 
condition. This shows that most (but not all) participants interpret the bypassing statements as 
not asking about any kind of mental state, but about deep and/or authentic mental states. 
 Participants’ ratings for the throughpass statements were puzzling. Even in the Body 
control condition, participants tended to agree with the throughpass statement. Moreover, 
compared to the Body control condition, throughpass ratings were not significantly higher in 
the Money condition. Even worse, their agreement with the throughpass statement was 
significantly higher in the Mind control condition than in the Money condition. As predicted, 
this suggests that the throughpass statement absolutely fails to measure what it was designed 
to measure (whether an agent’s mental states play a crucial role in the formation of their 
action) and rather seems to measure to which extent the agent is acted by external forces. 
Thus, defenders of the Bypassing Hypothesis do not need to worry about the fact that 
throughpass and bypassing statements are not negatively correlated. 
 Before we move on, one interesting result should be noted: though above the 
midpoint, attributions of free will were quite low in the Money condition, compared to moral 
responsibility attributions. This is probably due to the fact that external circumstances (dire 
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lack of money) put pressure on Bill to accept John’s offer. Thus, some participants seem to 
use ‘free will’ in a very demanding sense, in which one has to make decision independently 
from external pressures to count as ‘free’. However, this sense is probably not the one 
relevant to theoretical theorizing, as most philosophical accounts of free will would certainly 
conclude that Bill killed John’s aunt of his own free will. Thus, this is one more argument in 
favor of the conclusion that moral responsibility ratings might do a better job at tracking the 
philosophically relevant concept of free will. 
 
3.3. Answering the ‘best-fit-of-the-data’ objection 
Now, what about the fact that bypassing statements do not fully mediate the effect of 
scenarios on FW/MR judgments? My reply here is going to be technical but can be 
summarized as follows: this objection presupposes that, if participants’ perceptions of 
bypassing explain the effect of determinism on their free will and moral responsibility 
judgments, then we should expect participants’ agreement with bypassing statements to fully 
mediate the effect of determinism on their free will and moral responsibility judgments. 
However, this assumption is simply wrong. 
 More precisely, this assumption would be right if we were able to measure with 
complete accuracy participants’ perceptions of bypassing, free will and moral responsibility. 
But this is an unreasonable assumption, as items measures are susceptible to be interpreted in 
different ways by different participants. And, as soon as some measurement error is 
introduced, expectations of full mediations might no longer be reasonable. 
 To make this answer more salient, I decided to simulate some data. I distributed 200 
virtual participants across two conditions: Determinism and Indeterminism (100 in each 
condition). Participants in the Determinism condition were randomly assigned a Bypassing 
score between 1 and 4, and those in the Indeterminism condition were randomly assigned a 
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score between 4 and 7. Free Will scores were randomly computed from Bypassing scores by 
adding -1, 0 or 1 to Bypassing scores. Thus, we simulate a causal chain such as: condition → 
bypassing → free will. 
 When we analyze these simulated data, we find as expected that the effect of condition 
on Free Will is fully mediated by Bypassing, but that the effect of condition on Bypassing is 
not fully mediated by Free Will. So, the results of mediation analysis accurately describe the 
underlying causal structure. 
 However, in this case, our measures perfectly represent the underlying phenomena. 
What happens when a little noise is added? To find out, I randomly added some noise to the 
data by randomly adding -1, -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1 to the Bypassing and Free Will scores. The new 
‘inaccurate’ scores were still strongly correlated with the original scores (r = .92 and .93 
respectively), meaning that only a little measurement error was introduced. But this was 
already enough to make it so that Bypassing no longer fully (but only partially) mediated the 
effect of condition on Free Will (see Figure 6). 
 So much for the full mediation criterion, but what about choosing the model that best 
fits the data? To find out, I added more noise in Bypassing scores to simulate a situation in 
which the measurement error for Bypassing scores is greater than for Free Will scores (so that 
the correlation between original and actual Bypassing scores was 0.62). I then entered these 
data in the TETRAD program and asked the Greedy Search Algorithm to search for the model 
that best fitted the data. As can be seen in Figure 6, the model selected by the algorithm did 
not match the original causal structure. I also asked TETRAD to compare two causal models 
of the data: (i) condition → bypassing → free will, and (ii) (i) condition → free will → 
bypassing. It concluded that the second model was a way better fit than the first one. Thus, 
measurement error also compromises the use of such methods to determine which causal 
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structure is the right one, particularly when the measurement error is higher for the mediator 
than for the variable we seek to predict. 
 Are we in such a situation? I think we can reasonably say ‘yes’. Participants’ 
judgments about free will and moral responsibility are precisely the outcome we seek to 
measure so, barring lies and inattention, their answer should accurately reflect the 
phenomenon we are interested in. But we saw that bypassing statements were subject to 
ambiguity: some participants took them as speaking of agents’ mental states in general 
(including externally induced mental states) while other interpreted them as asking about the 
agent’s deep and authentic mental states. This ambiguity naturally translates in measurement 
error. Thus, we are clearly in a situation where giving too much weight to the fact that there is 
not a full mediation or that a model best fit the data than another might lead us to make wrong 
theoretical choices. 
 Not that I am rejecting the use of mediation analysis as a test for a certain hypothesis: 
clearly, if a theoretical account predicts that a phenomenon M explains the connection 
between two other phenomena A and B, we should expect measures of M to mediate the link 
between measures of A and B. However, present measurement error, it might not be 
reasonable to demand that this mediation be a full mediation or this model to be the best fit of 
the data, as measurement error tends to underestimate the indirect effect and overestimate the 
direct effect (VanderWeele, Valeri & Ogburn, 2012). Such statistical considerations should 
not trump other arguments for the theoretical model, such as its ability to explain a whole 




Figure 6. Causal models selected by the TETRAD Greedy Search Algorithm for simulated 
data, depending on the magnitude of measurement error. Measurement error is indicated by 
the correlation between actual data and original data (r). 
 
4. An error theory for compatibilist intuitions 
 
So far, I have argued in favor of the Bypassing Hypothesis, according to which seemingly 
incompatibilist answers are not genuinely incompatibilist but result from a confusion between 
determinism and bypassing. Thus, we could be tempted to conclude that, once that confusion 
is cleared, it turns out that most people have compatibilist intuitions. However, in the recent 
years, some have pushed the same kind of suspicions against compatibilist answers: 
participants’ seemingly compatibilist answers might not be really compatibilists and could be 
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explained away in a similar way we explained away incompatibilist answers. This approach is 
not incompatible with the Bypassing Hypothesis (it could that both seemingly compatibilist 
and incompatibilist answers can be explained away as mistakes), but it sheds doubt on the 
conclusion that laypeople are natural compatibilists. 
 
4.1. Early error theories 
Examples of such error theories for compatibilist answers are Feltz and Millan (2015)’s claim 
that people will ascribe “free-will-no-matter-what”, or Mandelbaum and Ripley (2012)’s 
“Norm Broken, Agent Responsible” (NBAR) account, according to which participants will 
ascribe moral responsibility to agents as soon as they perceive that a norm is broken (which 
might explain why participants attribute moral responsibility in concrete cases but not in 
abstract ones). However, such accounts are not very plausible, since people do not 
automatically ascribe free will and moral responsibility, even when a norm is broken. For 
example, in Andow and Cova (2016), we asked participants to imagine a universe in which 
everyone’s future is written in a magic book so that, anytime a person tries to act contrary to 
what is written in the book, the book will magically force this person to act against their will. 
Participants were presented with the story of John, whom the magical book forces to kill his 
wife against his will. In this case, most participants concluded that John did not act of his own 
free will, and was not morally responsible for killing his wife, showing that people do not 
ascribe free will “no matter what”. 
 
4.2. Folks as natural incompatibilists: the Intrusive Metaphysics Account 
A more recent and subtle error theory is Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2020)’s “intrusive 
metaphysics” account, according to which most participants fail to accept and integrate the 
deterministic assumptions of thought experiments such as the Supercomputer case but rather 
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“import an indeterministic metaphysics” into their interpretation of these scenarios. To put it 
otherwise: the apparent compatibilist judgments of participants who seem to accept that 
agents in deterministic universes can be free and morally responsible for their actions could 
be explained away by their inability to truly accept the deterministic setting of the thought-
experiment and their tendency to reinterpret it in indeterministic ways (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Nadelhoffer and colleagues’ Intrusive Metaphysics Account 
 
 To test this hypothesis, Nadelhoffer and his colleagues gave participants abstract and 
concrete versions of the Supercomputer and Eternal Recurrence cases developed by Nahmias 
and colleagues (2006). Half of participants received a version of these cases in which the 
agent was a robot rather than a human, but I will leave those aside to focus on participants’ 
answers to cases involving human agent. In these cases, participants were asked the 
traditional questions about the agent’s free will and moral responsibility, but also a series of 
questions aiming to probe to which extent they succeeded or failed to accept the deterministic 
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setting of the scenario. For example, in the concrete version of the Supercomputer case, they 
were asked: 
 
Chance: What do you think the chances are that Jeremy will do something different than what 
the computer predicts he will do? (Slider scale ranging from 0 = very unlikely to 100 = very 
likely) 
 
Here, I will focus on Chance as a measure of “metaphysical intrusion”, as Nadelhoffer and his 
colleagues themselves admit that “[Chance] is perhaps our best measure of intrusion”. 
 So what did they find? First, they found that a lot of participants indeed failed to 
integrate and accept the deterministic features of the vignettes. For concrete cases, only 47% 
of participants answered that the agent had zero chance to do something different. For 
abstract cases it was even less: 32%. Thus, it is clear that a lot of participants do import 
indeterministic assumptions in their understanding of these scenarios. This is a 
methodological issue future studies should keep in mind. 
 
 Concrete cases Abstract cases 
Chance Chance = 0 Chance > 0 Chance = 0  Chance > 0 
of his own free 
will 
39% vs. 48% 14% vs. 78% 73% vs.21% 13% vs. 78% 
freely 40% vs. 47% 13% vs. 77% 71% vs. 24% 14% vs. 76% 
fully morally 
responsible for 
24% vs. 62% 11% vs. 79% 44% vs. 41% 08% vs. 82% 
is blameworthy / 
praiseworthy 




31% vs. 69% 15% vs. 85% - - 
N 212 238 70 148 
Table 3. Percentage of answers below vs. above the midpoint for questions about free will 
and moral responsibility of human agents in Nadelhoffer et al. (2020), in function of whether 
participants answered that the agent had zero chance to act differently. For blame/praise and 
and desert questions, answers were reverse-coded when the agents’ action was good and I 
present the percentage of answers below or equal vs. above the midpoint. This re-analysis of 
Nadelhoffer et al. (2020)’s data was made possible by the fact that they shared their original 
data on osf.io/4z6r2/  
 
 But what happens if we only keep participants who answered that the agent had zero 
chance to act in another way? Do they give overwhelmingly incompatibilist answers? As we 
can see in Table 3, there is no simple answer to this question. For the abstract cases, 
participants’ free will and moral responsibility are very low – which is not surprising, as this 
in line with previous results (see section 2.2). For the concrete cases, results are more mixed. 
Free will ratings (for the free will and freely questions) are split around the midpoint, with 
basically half of participants giving rather compatibilist answers and half of participants 
giving incompatibilist answers. However, when we look at questions about moral 
responsibility, blameworthiness/praiseworthiness and desert, roughly two thirds of 
participants still give compatibilist answers (which is still pretty close to the results obtained 
by Nahmias and colleagues). If we take into account that the number of incompatibilist 
answers is likely to be inflated by the fact that Nadelhoffer and colleagues did not exclude 
participants who confused determinism with bypassing (since they had no bypassing items), 
then the results are not a big deviation from what has been observed by the previous literature, 
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as long as we focus on moral responsibility (as I have argued we should, and as I intend to do 
in this chapter). 
 Thus, a true estimate of participants’ intuitions about moral responsibility would 
require to exclude both seemingly ‘incompatibilist’ answers (due to confusion with 
bypassing) and seemingly ‘compatibilist’ answers (due to intrusion of incompatibilist 
assumptions). Given the results described in Table 3, I do not think doing so will lead to 
results widely different from those already observed in the literature – for moral responsibility 
at least. 
 
4.3. Additional limitations of the Intrusive Metaphysics Account 
Additionally, the Intrusive Metaphysics Account suffers from the same problem as the 
Incompatibilist Model: it has very low explanatory power. As we saw in Table 3, it cannot 
account for the difference between abstract and concrete cases, since this asymmetry subsists 
even when participants who make incompatibilist assumptions are excluded. Similarly, it is 
not clear that it can explain the difference between neurological and psychological 
determinism: why would participants import indeterministic assumptions in the second but 
not in the first case? Here, the account needs to be refined. 
 Moreover, the account claims that people import indeterministic assumptions into their 
comprehension of scenarios because “intuitive views about the indeterministic nature of 
human agency influence how people understand deterministic cases like Supercomputer”. 
However, this presupposes that people have an indeterministic view of human agency. But is 
it really the case? It is true that, when asked which of Nichols and Knobe’s Universe A and B 
is more like ours, most people choose Universe B (the indeterministic one). However, we 
have seen that participants’ understanding of these universes is plagued by a confusion 
between determinism and bypassing. 
 32 
 In a recent study, Giraud and Cova (in preparation; see also Giraud, 2021) asked a 
total of 4430 volunteers to imagine that they had been victim of a strange physics experiment 
and that they were now condemned to live in a temporal loop, regularly being sent back to the 
same point in time. Then, participants were asked the following question: 
 
Do you think the other persons around you in the temporal loop will always act the same way as 
long as you don’t intervene? 
• Yes: they will always repeat the same behaviors 
• No: certain behaviors will sometimes be different 
• I can’t say 
 
In this case, 72.5% of participants answered ‘Yes’, that people in the loop will always repeat 
the same behaviors, which seems at odd with the idea that people have a strong 
indeterministic conception of human agency. Moreover, they were then asked to imagine that, 
in this loop, they witness two men (Bob and Charlie) repeatedly killing their respective 
neighbor. The sole difference was that Bob can easily be talked out of killing his neighbor, 
while Charlie can’t. Among the participants who answered ‘Yes’ to the first question (and 
accepted determinism), 79% answered that Bob acted freely and 91% answered that he was 
morally responsible for killing his neighbor. Moreover, 81% answered that Charlie acted 
freely and 92% answered that he was morally responsible. Thus, it seems that most people do 
not see human agency as indeterministic, and that seeing it as deterministic does not prevent 
them from attributing free will and moral responsibility. As such, one of the main 
assumptions of the Pervasive Metaphysics account still needs to be motivated. 
 
5. A final question in guise of conclusion 
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In this chapter, I tried to give an overview of current debates on laypeople’s conceptions of 
free will and moral responsibility and their relationship with determinism. I have tried to push 
forward the view that people tend to be natural compatibilists, as it seems to me the best 
approximation of truth. However, there are still too many controversies to present this 
conclusion as definitive. But I would like to end on one of the main reasons why I am 
attracted towards natural compatibilism: I understand why people would be natural 
compatibilists, but I don’t understand why they would be natural incompatibilists. As 
mentioned earlier, practices and attitudes that presuppose the attribution of moral 
responsibility are pervasive. They also serve an important role in regulation social 
relationships. As such, it is reasonable that they evolved (biologically and/or culturally) to 
serve certain functions. However, I can’t see how these functions would be best served by 
imposing incompatibilist demands on moral responsibility. Indeed, from a practical point of 
view, such demands seem pointless. Thus, I can’t see why and how we would have come to 
develop an intuitive incompatibilist conception of moral responsibility in the first place. To 
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